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PRIORITIZING ABORTION ACCESS OVER 
ABORTION SAFETY IN PENNSYLVANIA 
RANDY BECK 
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
This conference was prompted by the prosecution of Dr. Kermit 
Gosnell, who ran an abortion clinic in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Dr. 
Gosnell was convicted in May of 2013 of charges arising from the killing of 
viable infants born in his clinic, the negligent death of an adult patient, and 
the systematic disregard of regulations governing the performance of 
abortions in Pennsylvania.1 One question proposed for our consideration is 
whether Dr. Gosnell is an “outlier,” a description offered by the National 
Abortion Federation following Gosnell’s indictment.2 
Presumably, one might want to know whether Gosnell was typical of 
abortion providers because it could shed light on contested questions 
concerning the justification for new abortion regulations. If Gosnell is 
uncharacteristic of abortion providers, one might argue, then his 
prosecution does not suggest the need for additional oversight. In this short 
essay, on the other hand, I argue that whether or not we can currently 
identify more providers like Gosnell, and there may well be some,3 his 
dangerous medical practice was a foreseeable consequence of the 
unsupervised market for abortion services in which he operated. 
Dr. Gosnell was able to routinely violate Pennsylvania law because 
Pennsylvania health officials decided access to abortion should be 
prioritized over monitoring compliance with regulations designed to ensure 
 
 1.  Joseph A. Slobodzian, Gosnell Guilty of Three Murder Counts, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER ,May 15, 2013, available at http://articles.philly.com/2013-05-
15/news/39258185_1_verdict-jury-gosnell-case; Sarah Hoye & Sunny Hostin, Doctor Found 
Guilty of First-Degree Murder in Philadelphia Abortion Case, CNN, May 14, 2013, 10:26AM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/13/ 
justice/pennsylvania-abortion-doctor-trial/.  
 2.  Press Release, National Abortion Federation, Open Letter to Patients from NAF 
President Vicki Saporta: Despite Recent Headlines, Quality Abortion Care is the Norm (Jan. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.prochoice.org/news/releases/20110121.html. 
 3.  See Kermit Gosnell is Not an Outlier, SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, http://www.sba-
list.org/negligence (July 24, 2013) (last updated Sep. 11, 2013). 
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the safety of abortion procedures. Prioritizing access over safety is an ironic 
development in the history of abortion rights activism. A key argument for 
recognizing a constitutional right to abortion was that legalization would 
promote safety by ensuring that abortions were performed by licensed 
medical professionals subject to oversight by the state,4 a premise 
undermined by the laissez-faire practices of Pennsylvania officials. 
Any concern that oversight of abortion clinics might unnecessarily 
restrict access can be adequately addressed through the familiar principle of 
general applicability. There should be no question that states can properly 
enforce against abortion clinics regulations applied generally to other 
medical facilities presenting comparable risks to health. 
 
 
I 
Numerous scandals in recent decades have been attributed to a 
combination of greed and lax regulation. A desire for wealth, an 
opportunity for profit that entails risks to others, and inattentive government 
officials can together produce significant social harm. Commentators have 
identified these conditions as root causes of the savings and loan crisis of 
the 1980s,5 the Enron scandal,6 and the financial crisis of 2008,7 to name a 
few. The investigation and trial of Dr. Gosnell suggest that the same 
elements of private avarice and minimal government oversight helped 
produce the dangerous clinic that Gosnell operated in Philadelphia. 
 
 4.  See, e.g., Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and American 
Association of Planned Parenthood Physicians as Amici Curiae supporting Respondents, in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S.113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (“Planned 
Parenthood believes that since abortion is a medical procedure, it should be governed by the same 
rules as apply to other medical procedures in general when performed by properly qualified 
physicians with reasonable medical safeguards.”). 
 5.  Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Liberalism, Public Virtue and JFK, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 
898 (1989) (“We face a massive crisis in the savings and loan industry—born of unbridled greed 
and creedal belief in deregulation.”). 
 6.  Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 
19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 471 (2002) (“[B]oth the California energy crisis and Enron’s collapse 
were caused by legislative and administrative failures to design regulatory institutions that 
adequately constrained opportunistic behavior.”). 
 7.  Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal 
Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wake-Up Call for Reforming Executive 
Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131 (2009); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xv–xxv (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (conclusions regarding causes of 
the financial crisis, focusing on excessive risks taken by profit motivated enterprises and failure of 
government regulators to act). 
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The grand jury that recommended charges against Gosnell prepared a 
lengthy report on his abortion clinic, concluding that the doctor “ran a 
criminal enterprise, motivated by greed.”8 A number of features of 
Gosnell’s abortion practice seemed designed to maximize his profit margin, 
often in ways that increased risks to patients. On the revenue side, 
Dr. Gosnell probably brought in tens of millions of dollars over the years 
through the performance of abortions. A 2005 price list shows prices 
ranging from 330 dollars for aborting a fetus at six to twelve weeks up to 
1,625 dollars if the fetus was at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks, the legal 
limit for elective abortions under Pennsylvania statutes.9 However, 
Gosnell’s competitive advantage in the market for abortion services 
consisted of his willingness to perform abortions other clinics would not, 
including abortions illegal under the laws of Pennsylvania and surrounding 
states: 
 
Gosnell was known as a doctor who would perform abortions at 
any stage, without regard for legal limits. His patients came from 
several states, including Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North 
Carolina, as well as from Pennsylvania cities outside the 
Philadelphia area, such as Allentown. He also had many late-term 
Philadelphia patients because most other local clinics would not 
perform procedures past 20 weeks.10 
 
Employees testified that Gosnell sometimes charged 2,500–3,000 
dollars for late-term abortions.11 
Based on conservative assumptions, the grand jury estimated that 
Gosnell would have taken in 1.8 million dollars a year performing abortions 
three nights a week, but “[i]n light of the testimony we heard that Gosnell 
performed the really late third-trimester abortions on Sundays, his take was 
likely much higher.”12 The grand jury’s estimate did not include revenue 
from the extra amounts patients were invited to pay if they wanted higher-
than-normal levels of sedation.13 Further, Dr. Gosnell was not particularly 
scrupulous about where the money came from. The grand jury found 
 
 8.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury XXIII, Misc. No. 0009901-2008, 23 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 
Jan. 14, 2011), available at www.phila.gov/districtattorney/PDFs/GrandJuryWomensMedical.pdf.  
 9.  Id. app. C. (showing that higher prices were charged if the patient was insured). 
 10.  Id. at 27. See also id. at 3 (“Most doctors won’t perform late second-trimester abortions, 
from approximately the 20th week of pregnancy, because of the risks involved. And late-term 
abortions after the 24th week of pregnancy are flatly illegal. But for Dr. Gosnell, they were an 
opportunity. The bigger the baby, the more he charged.”). 
 11.  Id. at 81, 88. 
 12.  Id. at 88. 
 13.  Id. app. C. 
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evidence that Gosnell defrauded an insurance company by convincing 
another doctor to bill for services performed by Gosnell’s clinic, allowed a 
patient to pay for an abortion using her cousin’s insurance card, and 
fraudulently tapped a Delaware abortion fund by falsely claiming that 
particular patients were from Delaware.14 One employee testified that when 
Dr. Gosnell performed second-trimester abortions before the 24-week limit, 
he would sometimes manipulate ultrasounds to make the fetus look bigger 
so he could charge more.15 
On the cost side of the ledger, Dr. Gosnell took a number of steps to 
keep the expense of performing abortions low. For instance, he employed 
untrained and unqualified personnel who worked for less money: 
 
• Gosnell “deliberately hired unqualified staff because he could 
pay them low wages, often in cash. Most of Gosnell’s 
employees who worked with patients had little or no remotely 
relevant training or education. Nor did they have any 
certifications or licenses to treat patients. Yet they did so 
regularly, and without supervision–in violation of 
Pennsylvania’s medical practice standards and the law.”16 
• Untrained and unlicensed staff (including a 16-year-old high 
school student) administered drugs to patients without 
individualized medical evaluation and then monitored the 
medicated patients.17 
• One of Gosnell’s patients, Karnamaya Mongar, died from 
medications administered by unlicensed and untrained staff.18 
Dr. Gosnell had been told a year earlier that one of these staff 
members “did not know what she was doing and that she 
routinely overmedicated patients.”19 
• Gosnell employed two individuals who had medical training 
but had not obtained medical licenses. They were referred to 
and acted like “doctors” whether or not Gosnell was present.20 
 
Dr. Gosnell also saved money on equipment and supplies: 
 
• One of the drugs Gosnell’s staff routinely used to sedate 
 
 14.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 89, 177.  
 15.  Id. at 81. 
 16.  Id. at 32. 
 17.  Id. at 51. 
 18.  Id. at 117–35. 
 19.  Id. at 119. 
 20.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 39–44.  
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patients had been out of favor for 10–15 years because safer 
alternatives had been developed, but Gosnell preferred the older 
drug because it was cheaper.21 
• Apart from one non-functioning defibrillator, Gosnell’s clinic 
did not have the equipment and drugs required under 
Pennsylvania law for resuscitation of patients.22 
• Gosnell’s clinic had one old EKG machine for monitoring 
patient heart rate and pulse, but it had not worked for at least 
six years.23 Even the death of a patient did not lead Gosnell to 
purchase the required equipment.24 
• The clinic had only one blood pressure cuff.25 
• “Several workers testified that Gosnell insisted on reusing 
plastic curettes, the tool used to remove tissue from the 
uteruses, even though these were made for single use only.”26 
 
These cost-saving measures presumably resulted in a relatively high 
profit margin on the abortions performed by Gosnell and his unlicensed 
staff. Moreover, abortion was only one of Gosnell’s moneymaking 
endeavors. Gosnell’s illegal abortion practice came to light when he was 
being investigated for running a “prescription mill,” allowing customers to 
obtain controlled substances like the narcotic Oxycontin based on 
prescriptions pre-signed by the doctor.27 
 
 
II 
Assuming the grand jury was correct that Gosnell was motivated by 
financial considerations, it should have been possible to deter some of the 
conduct harmful to his patients and the illegal abortions performed in his 
clinic. Assuming sanctions were significant enough and the perceived risk 
of imposition high enough, Gosnell might have adjusted course to stay on 
the right side of Pennsylvania law.28 As it played out, however, 
 
 21.  Id. at 7, 124–25. 
 22.  Id. at 75–76. 
 23.  Id. at 76. 
 24.  Id. at 92–93. 
 25.  Id. at 76. 
 26.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 49. 
 27.  Id. at 2, 44, 141. See id. at 23, 88 (Gosnell was allegedly among the three top Oxycontin 
prescribers in Pennsylvania).  
 28.  David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 100 
YALE L.J. 733, 740 (2001) (“The conventional economic model of deterrence assumes that 
individuals (and by extension, the entities they compose) have preferences and tastes independent 
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Pennsylvania officials gave Gosnell plenty of reason to believe that 
noncompliance with the law would be overlooked. Gosnell was the only 
doctor at his clinic at the time of a Department of Health (“DOH”) 
inspection in 1989.29 That inspection noted that, among other deficiencies, 
Gosnell had no nurses on his staff, even though state law required patients 
recovering from surgery to be monitored by nurses.30 Gosnell was 
nevertheless allowed to continue performing abortions. He was inspected 
again in 1992 and 1993, and the failure to hire nursing staff had still not 
been corrected.31 The 1993 inspection noted the problem, along with other 
violations, but DOH officials later inaccurately recorded that the 
deficiencies had been addressed.32 Thus, four years after the DOH noted 
Gosnell’s failure to hire nurses to monitor patients recovering from surgery, 
Gosnell was allowed to continue performing abortions even though he was 
still not in compliance.33 
In 1993, with the election of a pro-choice governor, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health abruptly decided to stop performing regular 
inspections of abortion clinics.34 Under the revised policy, the DOH did not 
visit Gosnell’s clinic for a period of over sixteen years.35 In theory, the new 
policy called for inspection of abortion clinics in response to complaints.36 
In fact, the DOH did not visit Gosnell’s clinic: when attorneys’ offices 
contacted them in connection with malpractice claims, when a pediatrician 
complained that multiple teenage patients had been infected at Gosnell’s 
clinic with a sexually transmitted parasite, when a twenty-two-year-old 
patient died in 2002 due to complications from an abortion Gosnell 
performed, when a medical examiner reported that Gosnell had performed 
an abortion on a fetus at thirty-weeks’ gestation (well beyond the 
Pennsylvania limit of twenty-four weeks), or even when a second patient 
 
of the content of legal prohibitions. Individuals will comply with a legal prohibition if the 
expected penalty–the expected cost to them of the violation–will exceed the gain they expect to 
derive from the violation. Two variables are relevant in assessing expected penalties: the 
magnitude of the formal sanction if the violation is detected (p) and the probability of detection 
(pdet), as perceived by the prospective violator.”); David C. Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: 
The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 46 (2013) (“The basic deterrence formula describes a ratio between two 
functions: severity of punishment multiplied by risk of imposition, which is itself a function of 
risk of detection, certainty of conviction, and swiftness of process, compared to the value of 
reward multiplied by probability of success.”). 
 29.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 139–40.  
 30.  Id. at 140. 
 31.  Id. at 140-42. 
 32.  Id. at 140–42. 
 33.  Id. at 142. 
 34.  Id. at 9, 147. 
 35.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 142–43. 
 36.  Id. at 143. 
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died in 2009 from an abortion at Gosnell’s clinic.37 The DOH did not return 
to Gosnell’s clinic until they were asked to accompany law enforcement 
officials investigating prescription drug abuses, and even then DOH 
officials grumbled about being “used” by law enforcement and “badgered” 
by the District Attorney to shut down Gosnell’s facility.38 
It was not just the Pennsylvania Department of Health, but also the state 
Board of Medicine, that overlooked or downplayed complaints about 
Gosnell’s clinic. In 2001, before any of Gosnell’s patients had died, one of 
Gosnell’s former employees informed the Board of Medicine of numerous 
problems at the clinic, including the use of unlicensed personnel to 
administer anesthesia, the filthy and unsterile conditions at the clinic, and 
the absence of licensed nurses to monitor patient recovery.39 A Board 
employee conducted a cursory investigation that did not involve a visit to 
the clinic or interviews of any of the unlicensed clinic employees, though he 
did talk to Gosnell and another doctor who had performed abortions there.40 
The Board closed its investigation into the former employee’s allegations 
on the same day that it decided not to investigate the death of twenty-two-
year-old patient Semika Shaw following an abortion by Gosnell.41 Nor did 
later complaints of malpractice or lack of insurance prompt the Board to 
take action with respect to Gosnell’s clinic.42 
 
 
III 
The 1993 Department of Health decision to stop performing regular 
inspections of abortion clinics was motivated by pro-choice political 
considerations, specifically, the fear that such inspections could result in 
“‘putting a barrier up to women’ seeking abortions.”43 Consideration was 
given to reinstating the inspections in 1999, but the Department concluded 
that “if they did routine inspections, that they may find a lot of these 
facilities didn’t meet [the standards for getting patients out by stretcher or 
wheelchair in an emergency], and then there would be less abortion 
 
 37.  Randy Beck, Overcoming Barriers to the Protection of Viable Fetuses, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2014). 
 38.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 152. 
 39.  Id. at 176–77. 
 40.  Id. at 177–78. 
 41.  Id. at 176. 
 42.  Beck, supra note 37. The Philadelphia Department of Health also failed to act on reports 
about the unsanitary conditions at Gosnell’s clinic, filed by one of its employees monitoring the 
clinic’s participation in a city vaccine program. See id. (manuscript at __). 
 43.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8 at 9, 147. 
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facilities, less access to women to have an abortion.”44 The revised DOH 
policy effectively prioritized access to abortion over the safety of abortion 
facilities and compliance with the requirements of state law. 
The decision of Pennsylvania health officials to prioritize abortion 
access over abortion safety is ironic in light of the history of pro-choice 
activism in this country. Pro-choice historical narratives often emphasize 
that many women had access to abortions before the Supreme Court 
recognized a constitutional right to abortion in Roe v. Wade, but that the 
procedures were frequently performed in unsafe conditions.45 The brief 
Planned Parenthood submitted in Roe estimated that about one million 
illegal abortions were performed each year, but highlighted the high risk of 
death, infection, sterility or other complications that accompanied these 
illegal abortions, often performed by non-physicians.46 The Roe Court took 
this argument to heart, noting that “[t]he prevalence of high mortality rates 
at illegal ‘abortion mills’” supported a state interest in regulating abortion 
clinics, particularly later in pregnancy: 
 
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like 
any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that 
insure maximum safety for the patient. . . . The prevalence of high 
mortality rates at illegal “abortion mills” strengthens, rather than 
 
 44.  Id. at 147. Sadly, Gosnell’s failure to comply with the requirements concerning 
emergency evacuation of patients contributed to the death of a patient named Karnamaya Mongar. 
Id. at 77 (“Another violation of Pennsylvania law proved significant the night Karnamaya Mongar 
died: Clinics must have doors, elevators, and other passages adequate to allow stretcher-borne 
patients to be carried to a street-level exit. Gosnell’s clinic, with its narrow, twisted passageways, 
could not accommodate a stretcher at all. And his emergency street-level access was bolted with 
no accessible key. Any chance Mongar had of being revived was hampered by the time wasted 
looking for keys to the door.”). 
 45.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (“The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal ‘abortion mills’ 
strengthens . . . the State’s interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are 
performed.”). 
 46.  Supra note 4. According to this brief: 
 
It has been estimated that about one million illegal abortions are performed each year. 
While some of these illegal abortions are performed by physicians, the often tragic 
consequences of clandestine abortions, many of them self-induced, or performed by 
non-physicians, have created a serious state and national health problem. The most 
serious consequence of bungled illegal abortion is, of course, the death of the pregnant 
woman. It is estimated that abortion-related mortality is under-reported by as much as 
fifty percent. Earlier estimates were that between 5,000 and 10,000 women died each 
year because of bungled illegal abortions. However, the number of deaths from criminal 
abortion has decreased in recent years as a result of several factors including the advent 
of antibiotics, so that a figure of 500 to 1,000 such deaths per year is probably a more 
reliable national estimate. Despite the fact that the death rate from illegal abortion has 
decreased, the adverse side effects of such abortions, including severe infection, 
permanent sterility or other serious complications are still epidemic. 
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weakens, the State’s interest in regulating the conditions under 
which abortions are performed. Moreover, the risk to the woman 
increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a 
definite interest in protecting the woman’s own health and safety 
when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.47 
 
Planned Parenthood takes the position that promoting the safety of 
abortion procedures is the key benefit of the Roe decision: “The most 
important benefit [of Roe] was the end of an era that supported the 
proliferation of ‘back alley butchers’ who were motivated by money alone 
and performed unsafe, medically incompetent abortions that left many 
women dead or injured.”48 
Planned Parenthood may be correct that legal abortions tend to be safer 
than the illegal abortions performed in the years before Roe. But if so, this 
is in large part a function of government oversight of the persons and 
facilities offering abortion services. In Pennsylvania, where government 
officials adopted a hands-off policy regarding abortion clinics, the result 
was Dr. Gosnell’s clinic, where two patients lost their lives, countless 
others were subjected to high risk medical procedures, and hundreds of 
viable fetuses and newborn infants were killed in violation of Pennsylvania 
law. 
 
 
IV 
The Gosnell grand jury recommended that abortion clinics in 
Pennsylvania be inspected and regulated in the same manner as other 
facilities offering comparable surgical procedures: “We recommend that the 
Pennsylvania Department of Health plug the hole it has created for abortion 
clinics. They should be explicitly regulated as ambulatory surgical facilities, 
so that they are inspected annually and held to the same standards as all 
other outpatient procedure centers.”49 This idea of subjecting abortion 
clinics to generally applicable regulations was endorsed by the Supreme 
Court in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, where the Court 
acknowledged that “[a] State necessarily must have latitude in adopting 
 
 47.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. 
 48.  Medical and Social Health Benefits Since Abortion was Made Legal in the U.S., 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/Medical_Social_ 
Benefits_Abortion.pdf.  
 49.  In re Cnty. Investigating Grand Jury, supra note 8, at 16. 
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regulations of general applicability in this sensitive area.”50 
General applicability is a test that has often been employed in contexts 
where courts are concerned with preventing excessive regulation targeted at 
particular persons or activities. An early example can be found in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, where the Court struck down a Maryland tax that 
targeted the operations of a federally-chartered bank, but indicated that its 
decision would not prevent collection of “a tax paid by the real property of 
the bank, in common with the other real property within the state, nor to a 
tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this 
institution, in common with other property of the same description 
throughout the state.”51 The Court was concerned that Maryland might be 
tempted to use targeted taxes to cripple the federal bank, perhaps as a favor 
to its own state-chartered banks,52 but presumably thought this risk was 
minimized in the context of a generally applicable tax on real estate or stock 
holdings that applied to Maryland citizens and and did not single out non-
citizens. Similar strategies have been deployed in other contexts. For 
instance, the federal government has been prevented from adopting 
regulations that commandeer state officials,53 but it has been permitted to 
subject states to regulations that apply generally to large employers.54 
Governments may not target religious conduct for regulation,55 but the 
Court has decided that the Free Exercise Clause permits application of 
generally applicable laws to religious individuals.56 Likewise, even though 
the Free Press Clause might protect news organizations from being singled 
out for regulation, they must comply with generally applicable rules that 
bind a broad array of citizens.57 
 
 50.  462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983). The Court in Akron struck down as medically excessive an 
ordinance requiring all second-trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital. Id. However, the 
Court seemed receptive to the idea that abortion clinics performing second-trimester abortions 
could be subjected to minimum standards applicable to “free standing surgical facilities.” Id. at 
437. 
 51.  17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819). 
 52.  Id. at 432. 
 53.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 186–87 (1992). 
 54.  Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985) (holding that 
Congress could apply Fair Labor Standards Act to local transit employees); Reno v. Condon, 528 
U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (upholding statute regulating use of personal data concerning drivers where 
it was generally applicable in that it applied to both public and private vendors of such 
information). 
 55.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 56.  Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 57.  Compare Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 592–93 (1983) (striking down tax on paper and ink that only applied to some press 
organizations), with Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (newspaper could be 
sued under generally applicable theory of promissory estoppel where it allegedly breached 
promise of confidentiality made to a source). 
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For many forms of health regulation, this general applicability principle 
could be deployed to promote the safety of abortion procedures, particularly 
in the second trimester, when the risks of abortion increase significantly.58 
The fact that a particular regulation is applied to a range of different 
outpatient facilities, not just abortion clinics, would give courts confidence 
that the regulation was genuinely designed to promote patient health. At the 
same time, subjecting abortion clinics to the regime of inspections and 
enforcement applicable to other surgical facilities would give patients 
confidence that public health officials were not sacrificing abortion safety 
in the pursuit of abortion access. 
 
 
V 
The experience in Pennsylvania leading up to the prosecution of Dr. 
Gosnell underlines the critical role played by public health officials in 
protecting the health of women undergoing abortions, as well as the lives of 
the unborn and the newborn. The willingness of public officials to 
vigorously enforce the laws governing abortion will play a significant role 
in determining whether Dr. Gosnell is in fact an outlier. 
 
 
 58.  Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the 
United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 729 (2004) (“Compared with women 
whose abortions were performed at or before 8 weeks of gestation, women whose abortions were 
performed in the second trimester were significantly more likely to die of abortion-related 
causes.”). 
